PROBLEMS OF SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION SPHERE BY THE BODIES OF EXECUTIVE AUTHORITIES

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to determine the problems of ensuring the security of the information sphere by executive authorities and to outline directions for their resolution. The transformation of Ukraine’s information policy under the conditions of a protracted armed conflict and martial law is investigated. Emphasis is placed on the threats arising from Russian information-psychological operations, which have lasted for over three decades and have not decreased in intensity after 2022. The risks associated with the use of open data for intelligence, blackmail, terrorist acts, and compromising critical infrastructure are highlighted. Attention is paid to the digitalization of public administration, particularly the development of the Diia system, e-justice, and state registers, which have ensured a high level of service accessibility and reduced corruption risks. Legal mechanisms for restricting constitutional rights and freedoms during martial law are examined separately. The necessity of preserving the information-legal basis for public control over the security and defense sector is emphasized. To improve the work of executive authorities in the information sphere during martial law, it is deemed necessary to legislate criteria and an exhaustive list of information rights and freedoms that may be restricted during this period, taking into account the need to maintain a balance between national security interests and the principles of transparency and openness of public information. The necessity of enhancing the consistency, continuity, and focus of state information policy is substantiated, particularly through the renewal and adaptation of the Information Security Strategy to the realities of a protracted and high-intensity armed conflict. The updated Strategy should include the creation of targeted programs for informational support of Ukrainian citizens abroad to maintain their connection with the Homeland and stimulate future return. Special attention in the updated text of the Information Security Strategy should be given to informational support for Ukrainians in the temporarily occupied territories and preventing the indoctrination of Ukrainian children and youth.